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HOW TO BE A BETTER PLEA BARGAINER 
Cynthia Alkon* and Andrea Kupfer Schneider**  
INTRODUCTION 
 
You are a public defender or a prosecutor and have a pile of cases to 
handle in court today.  All of the parties involved, including the judge, 
expect most of these cases to settle.  You have done hundreds, maybe 
thousands of plea bargains over the years.  But, every day when you have 
to negotiate, you have that feeling in the back of your mind (maybe in the 
pit of your stomach) that you could do better.  You never got to take a 
negotiation class in law school, and you have never attended a CLE or in-
house training on how to negotiate a plea bargain.  On the other hand, you 
are a very skilled trial lawyer.  You know how to evaluate a case and how 
to prepare for trial.  You know how to interview, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses.  In addition to your practice experience, you have had 
training in these skills.  Moreover, you have had training on forensic 
evidence, on specialized types of cases like driving while intoxicated or 
child sexual assault, and lots of trainings on trial practice.   
You know that there are excellent negotiators in your office and that 
they often get amazing deals.  While you feel pretty competent at 
negotiation, you would not consider yourself excellent.  Can that change? 
Can a highly skilled criminal trial lawyer learn how to be a highly skilled 
negotiator?  Of course.  Highly experienced lawyers and new lawyers alike 
can improve their negotiation skills (just as they improve their trial skills). 
But, without specialized CLE or in-house training, what can you do?   
This Article will focus on a relatively easy strategy to increase your 
effectiveness immediately, even as you wait for more negotiation training 
(which we discuss below).  Lawyers are often given checklists as part of 
learning how to handle certain types of cases or defenses.1  This Article is 
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1.   See, e.g., Emily LaGratta et al., Defender Checklists: A Toolkit for Practitioners, CTR. 
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going to focus on one key way that you can become a better plea bargainer: 
you can improve how you prepare for negotiation through having a 
negotiation checklist. 
The first part of this Article will focus on why preparation matters in 
negotiation and how a systemic model can be used.  Plea bargaining is, by 
definition, a negotiation to reach agreement between the defense and 
prosecution to settle a criminal case.2  Criminal law scholars are 
increasingly recognizing the importance of negotiation and training for 
negotiation in criminal practice.3  We will then turn to explaining our plea 
bargaining preparation sheet in detail, noting how each element of the prep 
sheet is important in negotiation in general and how this specifically applies 
in a plea bargaining context. 
 
I. WHY PREPARATION MATTERS IN NEGOTIATION 
 
Negotiation is a learned behavior much like communication overall. By 
the time we are negotiating on behalf of clients, we likely have many of 
these communication behaviors ingrained in us.  Perhaps through our family 
dynamics, perhaps through professional training, perhaps through 
socialization, or perhaps through other expectations, each of us has learned 
to communicate in one way or another. 
And yet we know that, like any other communication skill, negotiation 
skills can improve with careful thinking, practice, and reflection.4 While 
development of several negotiation skills is directly linked to personality 
traits that might need to be adjusted (i.e. developing more of an ability to 
ask questions and listen carefully or increasing flexibility or even 
understanding how cognitive psychology might influence your behavior), 
other aspects of negotiation, like preparation, are more often developed 
through devotion of time and energy.  In fact, we regularly tell our students 
that preparation is the easiest way to improve your negotiation skills, since 
                                                   
FOR CT. INNOVATION, http://sfpublicdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/05/Toolkit-San-
Francisco-Defender-Checklist-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSR5-FWZW]. 
2.   G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING (3d ed. 2012).  
3.   See, e.g., Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WILLIAM & 
MARY L. REV. 1445  (2016). 
4.   Michael Moffit & Scott Peppet, Learning How to Learn to Negotiate, in 1 THE 
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everything else can require a more challenging behavioral change.5   
Plea bargaining is the primary form of criminal case settlement.  The 
vast majority of cases, both state and federal, are resolved through plea 
bargaining.6  Some have argued that we should plea bargain fewer cases,7  
and we ourselves have argued that the practice of plea bargaining has 
significant flaws in terms of fairness.8 Some have argued that plea 
bargaining, supported by draconian minimum sentences and with little 
oversight by judges, has led to the mass incarceration crisis.9 These 
negotiations between unfettered prosecutors and underfunded defense 
attorneys are, in fact, a highly suspect and troubled aspect of our legal 
system.10 All of these allegations are worth investigation and attention as 
we continue to reform the criminal legal system.   
In the meantime, plea bargaining will continue to be a criminal lawyer’s 
primary activity. Despite this fact, law schools and continuing legal 
education programs for attorneys still discount the value of focusing on plea 
bargaining skills. Remarkably few law schools have specialized classes on 
plea bargaining. For example, Professor Jennifer Reynolds posted a query 
on the AALS dispute resolution list serve in November 2019, asking 
professors to respond if they (or a colleague) were teaching a stand-alone 
plea bargaining course. Eight professors responded that they taught plea 
bargaining, but not all were doing so as a regular course offered every 
year.11 In addition, the ABA Directory of ADR Classes does not list any 
plea bargaining courses.12 Trainings for prosecutors and public defenders 
primarily focus on honing trial skills.13  It has struck us (and others) that this 
                                                   
5.   See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow et al., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 107 (3d ed. 2019); Riskin et al., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, 160-
62 (5th ed. 2014); Russell Korobkin, NEGOTIATION 5-7 (2d ed. 2009).  
6.   See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
7.   Roland Acevedo, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical Abuse of Discretion? A Bronx 
County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987 (1995). 
8.   Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark, 22 NEW CRIM L. 
REV. 434 (2019).   
9.   See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration: Reforming 
the Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & 
CLASS 191 (2015). 
10.   For classic articles see, e.g., John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 8 (1978); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979).  
11.   Email on File from Professor Jennifer Reynolds, June 7, 2021. 
12.   ABA Directory Search, University of Oregon, last updated Jan. 2021, 
https://mylaw.uoregon.edu/aba-search/ [https://perma.cc/329J-LCD5] 
13.   See, e.g., the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association list of Continuing Legal 
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approach is flawed.14  As Jenny Roberts and Ron Wright have put it, “In 
short, . . . lawyers are training to operate in a trial-based world that does not 
exist.”15 
Part of this gap may well come from the belief that plea bargaining is 
not really negotiation.  One might assume that negotiation in legal practice 
is either civil case settlement (where the numbers of cases that are settled 
through either negotiation or mediation also constitute a vast majority of the 
total caseload) or deal-making, in which lawyers assist their clients in some 
kind of business transaction and help negotiate the terms.  This hesitation to 
include plea bargaining in the definition of negotiation comes from both 
traditional dispute resolution scholars and criminal scholars, neither of 
whom necessarily see their scholarship reflected in the other field’s work.  
Dispute resolution theorists worry, correctly, that plea bargaining has 
constraints and elements that are more complex than those seen in typical 
civil cases.16  Similarly, what little time criminal law professors spend 
discussing plea bargaining is often focused on the outcomes of the plea 
bargaining system rather than drilling down into the skills needed by 
lawyers on the front line.17   
With all of the negotiation books on the market and the explosion of 
negotiation classes in law school, one might wonder why any additional 
attention is needed to this subject.  Every student and practitioner has long 
heard that preparation for negotiation is necessary, yet classes in negotiation 
often fail to cover plea bargaining at all.  Similarly, criminal law, criminal 
                                                   
Education Programs for 2021, which includes cross examination training, training for DWI cases, fourth 
amendment practice, and mindfulness, but, no dedicated program on plea bargaining. TEX. CRIM. DEF. 
LAWS. ASS’N, https://www.tcdla.com/TCDLA/CLE_and_Events/CLE_Events/TCDLA/Events/Event_
Main.aspx?InitialArea=82BAE9D2-BBF2-4341-AF96-D280EA988D1D&hkey=d68eda32-707c-
4688-9c5b-42e04c014cf2 [https://perma.cc/9TWQ-VURJ].  
14.   Roberts & Wright, supra note 3. 
15.   Id. at 1450. 
16.   For a discussion of these constraints, see, Cynthia Alkon, How to Negotiate with 
Constraints:  Lessons from Plea Bargaining, in NEGOTIATION ESSENTIALS FOR LAWYERS 231, (Andrea 
Kupfer Schneider & Chris Honeyman, eds., 2019). 
17.   See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor 
to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
Bargaining Market]; Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial]; Michael O’Hear, Plea 
Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407 (2008); Ronald F. Wright & Marc Miller, The 
Screening/ Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002); Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561 (2014) 
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practice, criminal clinics, and externship placements in prosecutors and 
public defenders’ offices abound. Couldn’t plea bargaining be well-covered 
in these classes?  Law school criminal practice clinics often tout the trial 
skills or motion practice experience students will gain and do not focus on, 
or mention, plea bargaining experience.18  Even more commonly, criminal 
law and practice classes fail to incorporate negotiation theory to inform best 
practices.  Our goal in this Article is to bring these academic silos together 
to bring the advantages of negotiation theory into the criminal practice 
arena.  Already, some of these self-imposed barriers are starting to fall as 
scholars realize that negotiation theory and concepts can be illuminating and 
prescriptively helpful.19  
The fact that plea bargaining is a form of negotiation with significant 
constraints is exactly why negotiation skills matter.20 
                                                   
18.   See, e.g., description of the Stanford Law School Criminal Prosecution Clinic: “Students 
formulate case strategy, identify and interview witnesses, and conduct evidentiary motions, preliminary 
hearings, and occasional nonjury trials.” Criminal Prosecution Clinic: Clinical Methods, STANFORD 
LAW SCHOOL, https://law.stanford.edu/courses/criminal-prosecution-clinic-clinical-methods/ 
[https://perma.cc/YQ8W-BN3C]. See also description Tulane University School of Law Criminal 
Justice Clinic: “Representing Louisiana’s most vulnerable defendants at all stages of their criminal cases 
– investigation, pre-trial motions, trial, appeal, state post-conviction, and federal habeas – Clinic students 
have opportunities to brief and argue cases in appellate courts including the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
the Federal District Court, and the Federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.” Criminal Justice Clinic, 
TULANE LAW SCHOOL, https://law.tulane.edu/clinics/criminal [https://perma.cc/K5AL-PHAN]. 
19.  Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, s u p ra  n ote  17 ; Roberts & 
Wright, supra note 3 ; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting To “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as 
Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (1997); Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and 
Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205 (1999); CYNTHIA ALKON & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, 
NEGOTIATING CRIME: PLEA BARGAINING, PROBLEM SOLVING, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT 197-98, 235-45 (2019); Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea 
Bargaining: When Do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. L.J. 401 (2017) [hereinafter Alkon, Hard 
Bargaining]; Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence Beyond Lafler and 
Frye, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 377 (2016) [hereinafter Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining 
Competence]; Alkon, supra note 9; Cynthia Alkon, What’s Law Got to Do With It? Plea Bargaining 
Reform after Lafler and Frye, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 1 (2015); Cynthia Alkon, The Right to 
Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years after Brady v. Maryland, 38 NYU REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 407 (2014) [hereinafter Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining]; Alkon, 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining, supra note 17; O’Hear, supra note 17; 
Michael O’Hear & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Dispute Resolution in Criminal Law, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 
1 (2007); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Cooperating or Caving In: Are Defense Attorneys Shrewd or 
Exploited in Plea Bargaining Negotiations? 91 MARQ. L. REV. 145 (2007); Alafair S. Burke, 
Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007); Russell 
Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 213 (2007); Chad M. Oldfather, Heuristics, Biases, and Criminal Defendants, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 249 (2007). 
20.   Alkon, supra note 16.  
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Strong negotiation skills are what can help both prosecutors and defense 
lawyers move beyond the constraints.  Prosecutors are constrained by office 
policies, which are sometimes political, since the local district attorney is 
usually an elected official.21 There may be mandatory minimums or 
prosecutors may have office policies preventing them from reducing certain 
charges or dropping enhancements, such as gun enhancements.22  Defense 
lawyers are often constrained by the existing laws that leave them with few 
options for their clients.23   
By focusing on negotiating skills, lawyers can move beyond these 
constraints.  However, mastering the skills of assertiveness, empathy, 
flexibility, social intuition, and ethicality is predicated on going into each 
negotiation prepared. 24  For example, a defense lawyer who has fully 
investigated their case and knows that the evidence is weak on a key element 
(for example, that the witness to the crime has recanted), can use the skill 
of assertiveness with the prosecutor to explain why the case, or the particular 
charge, should be dropped.25  A well prepared defense lawyer will also know 
what the standard offers are for particular charges so they will know if, or 
when, to be assertive about negotiating a better offer.26  Our preparation 
sheet illuminates each of these skills by helping lawyers prepare to be 
flexible, to ask good questions, and to pay attention to communication 
choices.  Each of these elements on the preparation sheet helps to build 
negotiation effectiveness. 
Attention to preparation in advance of a negotiation would seem to be 
an easy place to start to improve one’s negotiation skills.  In other areas of 
leadership, we regularly hear adages on the wisdom of preparation and, in 
fact, the likelihood of failure when we do not.27  Unfortunately, in the U.S. 
criminal legal system, the simple calculus of taking time to prepare is often 
lost, or difficult due to the heavy caseloads, lack of resources, and 
                                                   
21.  Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining: An Example of Negotiating with Constraints, in 1 THE 
NEGOT.’S DESK REF. 683, 689 (Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017).  
22.   Id. at 689. 
23.   Id. at 691. 
24.   See generally Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Teaching a New Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13 (2012). 
25.   Alkon, supra note 21, at 694. 
26.   Id. 
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surrounding institutional culture.28 
This lack of preparation is evidenced to some degree by empirical 
studies on defense attorneys, showing that many of them do not engage in 
comprehensive interviewing of defense and prosecution witnesses.29  This 
is true even though defense attorneys recognize that weaknesses in the 
prosecution’s case are some of the main leverage points in a plea bargain.  
 
A. Goals for the Preparations Sheet 
 
We have several goals in the preparation sheet.  First, a prep sheet 
organizes our thinking.  Whether or not you fill out each box, it helps a 
negotiator conceptualize the major pieces that are needed prior to sitting 
down for a negotiation.  As the late Public Defender of San Francisco, Jeff 
Adachi, observed, “checklists combat complexity” and “checklists prevent 
mistakes.”  Adachi said, “in most cases, our missteps and oversights could 
have been avoided by using checklists.”30  Good negotiation requires good 
preparation.  The plea preparation sheet is a checklist to make sure that the 
lawyers (or students in the role of a lawyer) go into the negotiation as 
prepared as possible. Ineffective negotiation comes from winging it—using 
the plea preparation sheet helps to prevent this.  
Second, this prep sheet in particular brings together both typical 
negotiation training prep sheets,31 with the particular elements of plea 
bargaining preparation.  There have been attempts at plea bargaining 
preparation aids before, but these often miss the nuances of negotiation 
theory and focus only on facts or law without really forcing negotiators to 
think about how these elements get used in a negotiation.32  As we walk 
                                                   
28.   See, e.g., Neena Satija, How Judicial Conflicts of Interest are Denying Poor Texans Their 
Right to an Effective Lawyer, TEXAS TRIB. (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/08/19/unchecked-power-texas-judges-indigent-defense/ 
[https://perma.cc/RBU3-BBUD] (detailing examples where defense lawyers when judges prevented 
defense lawyers from investigating cases or denied funding after the fact). 
29.   Robert L. Doyel, The National College-Mercer Criminal Defense Survey: Preliminary 
Observations about Interviewing, Counseling, and Plea Negotiations, 37 MERCER L. REV. 1019, 1021 
(1986). 
30.   Emily LaGratta et al., supra note 1, at 1. 
31.   See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & DANNY ERTEL, GETTING READY TO NEGOTIATE (1995) 
(providing multiple tools for negotiation preparation based on the model in Getting to Yes). 
32.   Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic 
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73 (1995) (See pg. 133, Post Plea Bargain Checklist focused on 
reflective practices after each negotiation to improve lawyer skills in plea bargaining). See also, Zach 
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through each element below and how we have already used this in classes, 
we hope that negotiators can see the benefit of merging these perspectives. 
Third, this prep sheet is created to be used by both prosecutors and 
defense attorneys.  The skills that you need to be a good negotiator, as a 
prosecutor or defense lawyer, cut across these professional identities.  For 
example, delivering a strong closing argument is a skill that both types of 
lawyers need, and the skill is not fundamentally different between 
prosecutors and defense lawyers.  It is the same with negotiation skills—
they are not fundamentally different for prosecutors and defense lawyers. 
We think that it is important for both sides to recognize more clearly that 
there are often shared interests and goals, perhaps shared gaps in knowledge 
or facts, shared mistakes that can be made, and shared concerns as one 
proceeds through the negotiation process.  While prosecutors and defense 
lawyers could use the same checklist in a variety of areas, such as driving 
under the influence of alcohol cases, this is not the norm in practice.  CLE 
programs, how-to manuals, and training programs are more commonly 
divided by role.  Prosecutors train with prosecutors and defense lawyers 
with defense lawyers. 
The plea prep sheet intentionally is not divided by professional role. We 
believe that what matters in plea negotiation is good preparation.  The 
answers to the questions, the information filled in, will be different. Needing 
to understand the underlying interests and setting goals for the negotiation, 
however, are not different.  
Finally, like all good prep sheets, this is designed so that each negotiator 
learns from this prep sheet and then makes it their own.  If one creates 
muscle memory from practice, each negotiator will note the things that they 
do on autopilot versus the elements that need more work.  The best prep 
sheets become individualized over time to the negotiator’s strengths and 
weaknesses, to the particular cases they are handling, and to their particular 
jurisdictions. 
  
                                                   
Wavrusa, A Plea Negotiation Primer, TDCCA: THE TEXAS PROSECUTOR (Jan.-Feb. 2021), 
https://www.tdcaa.com/journal/a-plea-negotiation-primer/ [https://perma.cc/26PY-7YUD] (A 
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B. How We Have Used This Prep Sheet Already 
 
We have used the plea preparation sheet in our negotiation classes and 
in specialized criminal classes, including criminal clinics.  We also think it 
will work well as part of a training program for lawyers in both prosecutor 
and defense offices. 
As discussed above, plea bargaining is a unique form of negotiation.  It 
includes serious power imbalances and constraints.  This makes preparation 
all the more important, particularly for defense lawyers who are more often 
in the less powerful position.  The preparation sheet helps to drive this point 
home when used as a part of a class or training. 
The first step in using the plea preparation sheet in training or classes is 
to have students fill it out with facts from the simulation.  Even those who 
have more of a background in criminal practice will quickly see that there 
are a variety of things that they may not have been thinking about or 
informed about. 
For example, we regularly see students focusing on their individual 
interests and needs and not thinking about their counterpart.  The plea 
preparation sheet discourages this approach and demands that students 
consider the interests of their counterpart.  We often find that students have 
a hard time filing this part out and thinking about other’s interests.  This is 
a key point for discussion as we emphasize the value of understanding what 
matters to your counterpart in order to come to a negotiated agreement.33 
This is no less true in the context of negotiating criminal cases.  Defense 
lawyers who focus only on their clients’ interests and do not understand that 
the prosecutor cannot plead out certain cases to lower offenses without the 
approval of their boss, will be unlikely to figure out what they might need 
to do to get that approval.  Does the defense attorney need to talk to the 
prosecutor’s boss directly?  Does their client have certain kinds of 
mitigating circumstances that will be more likely to convince the 
prosecutor’s boss that this case is an exception to the policy?  
Prosecutors and defense lawyers should be thinking about what the 
good or bad facts in their case are.  What is the defendant’s criminal history? 
What are the laws and policies that influence this case?  Are there minimum 
sentences?  If you have bad (or challenging facts) your zone of possible 
                                                   
33.   ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: TOOLS FOR COPING WITH CONFLICT 19-
41 (1996). 
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agreement is different.  The zone of possible agreement is also different in 
different jurisdictions.  Even within the same state, or county, there can be 
vast differences in how individual cases are treated, what standard offers 
are, and therefore, what the zone of possible agreement is in that court or 
county or state.34 
Past the facts, the prep sheet can help consider next steps. For example, 
defense lawyers are supposed to consider collateral consequences.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court demands that lawyers advise about immigration 
consequences in any plea deal.35  However, defense lawyers may not take 
the time to find out if pleading to a certain case will mean the defendant will 
be evicted, or lose their job, or lose their professional license.36  This may 
be even more true with less serious cases, like misdemeanors, which can 
still carry significant collateral consequences.37  The preparation sheet flags 
the importance of asking about these consequences for defense lawyers.  It 
also flags that these things may be points of impasse to prosecutors.  One of 
us did her first jury trial, a misdemeanor petty theft, entirely due to her 
client’s concerns about immigration consequences.38  This concern was 
mentioned during plea negotiations, but the prosecutor seemed to reject it 
without serious consideration of other possible options.  It matters for both 
prosecutors and defense lawyers to think about collateral consequences and 
to consider whether another outcome, without the collateral consequence, is 
an option. 
In the above case, it might have helped if there were a range of possible 
other charges, without the immigration consequences.  And the negotiation 
prep sheet pushes us to consider these options as well.  Penal codes in the 
United States are written with a full range of possible options and ways to 
                                                   
34.   ALKON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 129-30. 
35.   Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
36.   Sarah Berson, Beyond the Sentence—Understanding Collateral Consequences, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Feb. 26, 2013), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/beyond-sentence-
understanding-collateral-consequences [https://perma.cc/DS4T-HHHU?type=image] (“Although these 
consequences can have a profound impact on the lives of those convicted, until recently, judges, 
prosecutors or defense counsel seldom discussed or considered collateral consequences.”) See also, 
NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES ON CRIM. CONVICTION, 
https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ [https://perma.cc/69V3-49U2].  
37.   See generally Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in 
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011). 
38.   Unfortunately, the trial ended in a guilty verdict as not wanting the collateral consequence 
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charge the same acts.39  It is useful, before starting a negotiation, to have a 
list of what those options are.  What are lesser offenses?  What are 
enhancements that can be charged or dropped?  And, what are the alternative 
processes?  Does one charge or another qualify for a drug court?  Lawyers 
can often overlook the full range of options without recognizing that option 
generation can be an important part of any negotiation.  One of the reasons 
plea bargaining is often thought of as a highly constrained negotiation is the 
concern that there are few options.  Defense lawyers and prosecutors are 
often trapped into thinking about every case with the same charge in the 
same way.  This section reminds them to not think so narrowly.  It is not 
possible to have a unique outcome for every drug sales case, but when it is 
possible, it is more likely to happen if the lawyers have other options to 
propose during the negotiation. 
 
C. How to Use a Prep Sheet  
 
The plea preparation sheet is a starting point and tool to help learn how 
to prepare for a plea negotiation.  Using the plea preparation sheet regularly 
can help to develop standard routines for cases—so students (and then 
lawyers) are thinking expansively about what matters, what they know, and 
what they need to know, before starting a plea negotiation. It helps to create 
good habits in preparation. 
 
II. THE ELEMENTS OF THE PREP SHEET  
 
This next section of the Article runs through the elements of the plea 
bargaining preparation sheet that we created to understand two primary 
concepts.  First, we will explain why each element is important to 
negotiation in general using both negotiation theory and empirical studies 
to demonstrate the significance of this preparation.  Second, we will review 
how these elements are manifested in plea bargaining negotiation in 
                                                   
39.   Alkon, supra note 9 (proposing legislative change to reduce prosecutorial power in plea 
bargaining); Cynthia Alkon, What’s Law Got to Do With It? Plea Bargaining Reform after Lafler and Frye, 
7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 1, 22-26 (2015) (discussing reform to penal codes to reform plea bargaining 
practice); Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining at 582-588 (discussing how 
the variety of charging options gives prosecutors extraordinary power in the plea bargaining). 
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particular and how both the defense attorney and prosecutor will be better 
served—and more effective—if they have prepared on these elements in 
advance. 
A. Interests & Goals 
 
It is usually logical to start the preparation for a negotiation by 
considering what is important—needs, motivations, and interests—and then 
setting a goal for measuring those accomplishments. Effective 
negotiators—and lawyers negotiating on behalf of clients—recognize that, 
while intuitive, clear specific thinking about interests and goals make it far 
more likely that they will be achieved. 
 
Case Name             
Charge             
Sentence Minimum/Maximum          








    
Goals     
 
1. Interests  
 
The first thing to think about in every negotiation is the interests of the 
parties.40  We might imagine that this is pretty simple—the prosecutor wants 
to punish the perpetrator and the defendant wants to avoid that.  And yet 
understanding the real interests of the parties—versus their opening offers 
or assumed positions—is crucial in terms of meeting their needs.  In 
negotiation theory, the difference between positions and interests is often 
                                                   
40.   ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM L. URY, & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 42-57 (3d. ed., 2011); David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, Interests: 
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highlighted as the crux of more effective negotiations,41 and the skills to 
prepare those—interviewing, gathering facts, active listening—are 
highlighted as necessary for client-centered counseling.42  In two-party 
negotiations, where lawyers represent single clients, lawyers are expected 
to help clients recognize their own interests beyond positions (i.e. the client 
wants to sue and the interest is financial security or precedent or getting the 
job back).  Lawyers can then assist their client in prioritizing their interests, 
giving the lawyers a road map for more successful negotiations. 
Note that the prep sheet does include all sides in the negotiation.  We 
want to be clear—it is not enough to understand your own interests and that 
of your client’s.  In order to better persuade your counterpart, it is quite 
useful to understand (or make a good guess about) their interests.  You 
might be wrong and miss something completely.  At the same time, given 
the amount of repeat play in the legal field and what experience can teach 
us, working hypotheses of the counterpart’s respective interests can be 
useful.  These hypotheses can form the basis of conversation and 
information gathering, will then likely help frame potential elements of the 
agreement, and can also serve as persuasive tools themselves (i.e. “both of 
us want what is best for this family” or “let’s talk about how we keep this 
neighborhood safe while getting treatment for the mentally ill”). 
In sophisticated negotiation training for lawyers, we often note that the 
lawyers themselves might have interests in the negotiation—perhaps getting 
it done quickly or looking good to the senior partner—that are in addition 
to the client’s interests.  Being aware of these sometimes common interests 
can also help move the negotiation along efficiently.  (“We both would 
prefer to minimize discovery costs.  Can we agree on a limit of two 
depositions?”).  
Yet plea bargaining is already more complicated on its face and our prep 
sheet reflects that.  The defense attorney and prosecutor each have their own 
interests (perhaps the shared one of managing their case load) as does the 
defendant.  We have also added a column for victim interests or the press or 
the public, which might align, but often do not.  Each case, each victim, and 
each jurisdiction will play out differently as to how impactful the interests 
                                                   
41.   FISHER ET AL., supra note 40, at 42-57. 
42.   Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
103 (2010); STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: 
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 21-32 (2015). 
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are on the actual negotiation.  The pressure of the press or public to be tough 
or to drop charges should be considered.  Similarly, some victims will desire 
more involvement while others will not. Their interests—and cooperation—
should also be prepared for in a negotiation so that the prosecutor is not 
blind-sided, having not considered this. 
In the plea negotiation context, interests include those that may be 
beyond the case itself.43  For example, both defense lawyers and prosecutors 
have an interest in managing their caseloads.  Prosecutors may have an 
interest in career advancement.44  Prosecutors have office policies to which 
they need to adhere. Defendants may be concerned about collateral 
consequences (will they lose housing, jobs, custody of their children?)45 
Defense lawyers that understand the underlying interest of the prosecutor 
with whom they are working are in a better position to frame their arguments 
in more persuasive ways.  Prosecutors are often less concerned about what 
a defendant wants than how they can explain or justify a particular deal to 
their boss.  Defense lawyers that understand those interests are better able 
to pull out facts that support making an exception to an office policy, such 
as dropping a school zone enhancement, or mandatory jail time.  Why is this 
case different? Why should a prosecutor look at this case differently? 
  
                                                   
43.   ALKON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 73-74 (underlying interests can include case 
management, career advancement, reelection (for judges and district attorneys), reputation, and 
maintaining good working relationships). 
44.   See Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives 
of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2005) (reporting higher trial rates in jurisdictions where 
prosecutors would make more money in private practice, after leaving the prosecutor’s office). 
45.   See, e.g., NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES ON CRIM. CONVICTION, 












Having clarified and prioritized the interests of the parties, it is now 
time to turn to setting goals.  Negotiation literature (as well as business 
literature) has repeatedly demonstrated that setting specific, optimistic and 
realistic goals will be most successful.46  First, goals should be specific—as 
in, the defendant should be locked up for 3 years or the charges should be 
dropped.  When goals are vague (let’s just hope for the best or let’s see what 
they have to say), negotiators are less likely to work toward their 
achievement.  It is the difference between a new year’s resolution to be 
“more healthy” and a commitment to stop smoking or walk for twenty 
minutes a day.  While vague pledges to change behavior make us feel better 
in the moment, they are completely ineffective in actually changing 
behavior.  Similarly, setting negotiation goals that are specific are needed to 
engage our own incentive structure.  With specific goals, negotiators are 
willing to go back and forth more often, be patient while negotiating (rather 
than prematurely accepting a less optimal outcome), and work harder to 
reach that goal. 47  
Second, goals need to be optimistic or aspirational. An easily achievable 
goal might sound safe (I know that I can get the prosecutor to drop the gun 
charge) but shortchanges the client in terms of what you might achieve. 
These aspirational goals help frame our first offer (few of us get more than 
what we ask) and triggers the patience and effort that are needed to succeed. 
Jennifer Brown calls this the satiation theory of hope.48  One can plan to 
drop back to a “safe” offer as a second or third bid (we will discuss 
concession management later in the article) but there is no good reason to 
start with the “safe” first bid.  The aspirational goal also serves to “anchor” 
                                                   
46.     Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Aspirations in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 675 (2004) 
(“Negotiators should establish optimistic aspirations because empirical evidence has shown negotiators 
with higher aspirations tend to achieve better bargaining results.”); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of 
Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1661, 1669-70 (1997); Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and 
Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2002); G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: 
NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 34 (2d ed. 2006) (“Research has repeatedly 
shown that people who have higher aspirations in negotiations perform better and get more than people who 
have modest or ‘I’ll do my best’ goals.”). 
47.   Korobkin, supra note 46; Brown supra note 46, at 1670.; Sally Blount White & Margaret 
A. Neale, The Role of Negotiation Aspirations and Settlement expectancies in Bargaining Outcomes, 57 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 303 (1994). 
48.   Brown, supra note 46. 







80 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 66 
 
the negotiator to hold onto these goals as long as possible.49 
Finally, goals do need to be justifiable and realistic.  This takes research 
in understanding what the typical range of outcomes have been.50  Perhaps 
the outcomes might be different in various neighboring jurisdictions or with 
different judges.  As we will discuss in the next section, having a grounding 
in law and policy is crucial for understanding what is fair and just.  
Similarly, as you set your goals, this understanding of fairness will inform 
your thinking.  If no one has ever been released after a sixth DUI, asking for 
this will make a defense attorney look ill-informed and naïve.  On the other 
hand, demanding that this driver be sentenced to life in prison could make 
the prosecutor look equally disconnected from reality.51 
There are cases that lend themselves to standard deals, like driving 
under the influence or possession of drugs.  To agree to a deal that is outside 
the norm requires that there is something different about the case (e.g., are 
there problems with the evidence? Is the defendant in a unique situation?).  
In these types of cases, lawyers should know what the standard deals are 
and should be able to decide if there is some reason to set a different goal 
for a plea outcome. 
There are also a wide variety of cases, such as crimes of violence 
(ranging from misdemeanor assault to first degree murder), that are very 
fact specific.  In these cases, it is arguably even more important to set clear 
goals for the negotiation.  In many jurisdictions, standard cases have first 
offers at arraignment.  This puts defense attorneys in the position of having 
to make a counter offer, if the first offer is not acceptable.  By contrast, cases 
that don’t lend themselves to standard deals often don’t receive early offers 
by the prosecutor.  In some cases, particularly more serious cases, the 
prosecutor may never make an offer.52  In death penalty cases the plea 
                                                   
49.   See infra Section D for a further discussion of negotiation errors and how to prepare to 
minimize them. 
50.   Doing this kind of research can be a challenge because of the lack of data. See generally, 
Schneider & Alkon, supra note 8, at 447. 
51.   We recognize that there might be circumstances where the law would allow for such a 
sentence and where defendants are sentenced to long terms over offenses that do not seem to deserve 
such terms.  If the law allows for absurdly long sentences, and if these kinds of sentences are routine in 
a particular jurisdiction, it might not, in fact, be disconnected from reality. 
52.   Not every case has a plea offer and plea bargaining rates vary by the type of charge.  For 
example, in Texas, 94% of all criminal convictions in district courts were due to a guilty plea in 2017. 
However, 62.5% of capital murder and murder convictions were due to a guilty plea, and over 95% of 
drug convictions were due to a guilty plea.  See, Annual Statistical Report for the Texas Judiciary, Fiscal 
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negotiation may be around whether the prosecution will agree to life in 
prison without parole—as any sentence less than death may be the goal of 
the negotiation.53  In other factually unique cases, prosecutors may not make 
an offer at arraignment as they may want to gather more information about 
the case, such as the extent of injuries, and to be sure about the defendant’s 
prior record.  Setting a clear goal can make all the difference in these kinds 
of cases.  From the defense perspective, these cases can be some of the few 
cases where they may be able to set the anchor with a clearly articulated 
first offer (based on setting a clear goal).54 
 
B. Investigation & Criteria 
 
In many of the articles on plea bargaining skills, authors noted how little 
time both defense attorneys and prosecutors have per case—and how hard 
it is to perform the needed research for a particular defendant.55  From a 
negotiation perspective, this is damning.56  Few would disagree with the 
proposition that assertiveness is one of the key skills in negotiation.  Yet, 
without having the facts, assertiveness starts to represent the old adage that 
when you don’t have the law, argue the facts.  And when you don’t have the 
facts, pound the table.  Effective negotiators save pounding the table for 
selected cases and do not rely on it as a regular feature of their skillset.  To 
turn to the other part of this adage, understanding the law is also crucial in 
negotiation for setting the criteria and understanding what is a fair outcome. 
  
                                                   
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ9C-W8M7].  
53.   See, e.g., Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 475, 483 
(2013) (“[T]he threat of the death penalty increases the likelihood of reaching a plea agreement by 
approximately 20 percentage points. In practical terms, the death penalty increases the plea-
bargaining rate from approximately 40% to 60%. In other words, the threat of capital punishment deters 
roughly two out of every ten death-noticed defendants from pursuing a trial.”); Albert W. Alschuler, 
Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 678-80 (2009) (concluding that “Plea 
bargaining perverts the role of counsel as it trivializes the purposes of the death penalty.”).  
54.   See infra Section II.D.5. (discussing negotiation errors and strategies regarding 
anchoring). 
55.   Doyel, supra note 29, at 1026-27. 
56.   Doyel, supra note 29; see also Roberts & Wright, supra note 3. 
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1. Knowing the Case 
 
For beginning negotiators, understanding the facts of the case is often 
the easiest way to start to improve your skills.  With knowledge comes 
confidence, and with confidence comes the ability to speak calmly about 
one’s interests and goals.  Each lawyer should be their own expert about the 
facts of their case, what actually happened, and reports from the scene.  In 
criminal law, more so than in other areas, this knowledge of the facts should 
also extend to the defendant and the broader context as punishment and 
rehabilitation often depend on the judge’s or prosecutor’s personal 
judgment about the individual defendant.57  Will this defendant be a danger?  
Will this defendant commit another crime?  Does this defendant have a 
supportive family, job, or other reason to believe that the accused behavior 
is an anomaly?  Without knowledge of defendant’s family or history, 
                                                   
57.   See generally HERMAN, supra note 2 (background information to know about the 
defendant as part of preparation for plea bargaining).  In an effort to move beyond personal judgements, 
a number of states and jurisdictions are using risk assessment tools, which have their own challenges in 
terms of bias.  See Rick Jones, The Siren Song of Objectivity: Risk Assessment Tools and Racial 
Disparity, CHAMPION, Apr. 2018.  Risk assessment tools are being used at sentencing, which arguably 
is not their intended use.  See, e.g., Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO L.J. 57 (2018) (arguing that 
risk assessment tools not designed to be used in sentencing); see also Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk 
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defense attorneys have less ammunition with which to argue.  Similarly, 
prosecutors may end up sending to jail (and spending taxpayer dollars) on 
defendants who do not warrant that punishment (and then potentially facing 
press and community criticism for doing so).  It would seem that this is an 
easy fix—preparation is “just” a matter of spending the time.  And yet we 
know, for many practicing criminal lawyers, this is no easy fix at all. 
Defense lawyers often have high caseloads58 and, if they are paid by the 
case, their pay may be so low that they cannot afford to spend any serious 
time on each case.59  The combined impact of high caseloads and inadequate 
pay often means that the structure is such that defense lawyers cannot 
adequately prepare.  But, putting aside that important issue for now, good 
lawyering demands that we train lawyers to prepare fully, by knowing at 
least the facts and the law for their cases.60  The plea preparation sheet 
reminds the preparer to make sure they know the elements of the offense, 
that they have the facts to support each element, or to highlight a lack of 
evidence to support a particular element as a possible area for negotiation.  
For example, if a defendant is charged with possession for sale of a 
controlled substance, and the only facts in the case are that the defendant 
was found with a controlled substance, in an amount that is small enough to 
be for personal use, it may be difficult for the prosecution to prove that it 
was possessed for sale.  The lack of evidence could support reducing the 
charge to a simple possession. 
Finally, good facts for either side or the law itself may give that side 
leverage in the plea negotiation.  Prosecutors more often have this 
advantage.  For example, if a case has been charged without possible 
enhancements, that can be leverage in the plea negotiation, threatening the 
                                                   
58.   See generally Oliver Laughland, The Human Toll of America’s Public Defender Crisis, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2016, 6:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/07/public-
defender-us-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/F7C9-4NZC] (reporting on high caseloads for 
public defenders); see also Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Jugal K. Patel, One Lawyer, 194 Felony Cases, and 
No Time, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/31/us/public-
defender-case-loads.html [https://perma.cc/SJF4-67FV].  For an article detailing the problem in Texas, 
see Satija, supra note 28.   
59.   See Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence, supra note 19, at 394 
(discussing the problem of the “meet and plead” defense in the context of plea negotiations); see also 
Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 
60.   See Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence, supra note 19, at 391 
(discussing three basic questions competent defense lawyers should answer in plea preparation: are there 
any possible defenses to the charges; are there any possible pre-trial motions, and are there possible 
additional charges or sentencing enhancements.) 
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defendant that if they reject the deal, that the enhancement will be added.61 
 
2. Law/Policy/Criteria  
 
Law & Policy 









Prosecutorial Policies?  
 
Court History/Judge  
 
Every negotiation textbook, and almost every popular negotiation book 
as well, discusses the importance of standards or criteria as a way of 
grounding the negotiation in fairness.62  Finding standards help negotiators 
in a myriad of ways.  First, it helps the negotiator set their own parameters—
what appears reasonable? What seems to be an excellent outcome 
comparatively (and therefore might be the optimistic goal) and what seems 
absolutely terrible (in which it would be worth it to proceed to trial)?  By 
understanding the range of outcomes, negotiators can anchor themselves, 
knowing that what they propose is reasonable and justifiable.  Moreover, 
these standards can be used to persuade the negotiation counterpart.63  The 
                                                   
61.     Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (holding that the threat to seek death if the 
defendant did not accept the guilty plea did not make the plea involuntarily and unintelligently made); 
see also Alkon, Hard Bargaining, supra note 19 (recommending better regulation of prosecutors to 
prevent threats in plea bargaining). 
62.  Even the most popular negotiation books devote whole chapters to criteria. For example, 
scholar Richard Shell includes a chapter entitled “Third Foundation of Negotiation Effectiveness,” and 
Getting to Yes has an entire chapter devoted to fairness, “Insist on Using Objective Criteria.” See SHELL, 
supra note 46, at 40; FISHER ET AL., supra note 40, at 82-95; see also MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 116-19; RISKIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 166-67. 
63.  Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of Legitimacy in Criminal Negotiations, 
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counterpart will also want to feel fairly treated—that the deal they are 
getting for their defendant or on behalf of the state and, in some cases, the 
victim, is within the range of what other outcomes have been.  Few lawyers 
will come into a negotiation claiming they want or expect “more than is 
fair,” so a full comprehension of these criteria is needed to persuade them. 
In plea bargaining, one might assume that the only standards are trial 
outcomes and that researching these would be sufficient.  Yet, when 97% 
of criminal convictions come without a trial, one needs to understand how 
those cases were resolved.  This is why the prep sheet we have created forces 
both sides to fully understand all the different elements that go into creating 
criteria and the ways in which “fairness” can change based on the defendant, 
the court, the prosecutors, or evolving policies. 
As discussed earlier, competent assistance of counsel requires that 
defense attorneys advise their clients of any immigration consequences if 
they plead guilty.64  Beyond that, good lawyering demands that defense 
lawyers advise their clients about other collateral consequences such as 
concerns about losing professional licensing, public housing, impacts on 
family law cases, etc.65 
                                                   
strategy in terms of setting one’s goals, and it also helps to frame persuasive arguments to the negotiation 
counterpart.  As Professors Batra and Oliver write: 
One less obvious advantage of raising criteria to justify offers is simply that raising 
criteria provides a justification for defense counsel to make a demand. Research 
has shown that the simple step of providing a justification for a demand, even a 
frivolous one, has the power to induce compliance.   Defense counsel, then, may 
find themselves at an advantage by using norms for judicial exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. They will be able to better justify their offer and thus 
increase the likelihood that prosecutors will not reject the offer out of hand. By 
saying, “I think this offer is acceptable because … ,” defense attorneys can 
bolster their bargaining position and induce the same psychological effect on 
their negotiation partners—prosecutors—as in any other negotiation context.  Id. 
64.   Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
65.   Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function, ABA (4th ed. 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/[https:
//perma.cc/BZ85-MYC6] (ABA Standard 4-1.3(h) for the Defense Function indicates that defense 
lawyers have “a duty to consider the collateral consequences of decisions and actions, including but not 
limited to the collateral consequences of conviction.”). Holistic defense means assisting the client 
beyond the single criminal case and considering (and assisting) in a variety of ways to minimize or 
decrease collateral consequences of convictions and addressing problems that may contribute to criminal 
behavior (such as homelessness, poverty, mental illness, and addiction), see e.g., the Bronx Defenders 
definition of Holistic Defense available at https://www.bronxdefenders.org/holistic-defense/. See also 
NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES ON CRIM. CONVICTION, supra note 36 (providing 
a state-by-state listing of collateral consequences of criminal convictions). 
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Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike should also know whether the 
facts in a case give rise to particular motions.  For example, was the search 
one that will give rise to a motion to suppress the evidence?66  There may 
be times when the prosecutor recognizes that the search was problematic, 
or otherwise doesn’t want to risk a particular motion succeeding.  In those 
situations, a prosecutor may want to make a better plea offer.  Defense 
lawyers know that simply having a motion to run, doesn’t mean it will be 
granted in their client’s favor.  It may, however, be useful leverage in the 
plea negotiation.67 
Finally, location matters in plea negotiations. The single most important 
fact in what happens on a criminal case is where it happens.  Who is the 
prosecutor? What are the prosecutor’s office policies?  What judge will the 
case go in front of?  What is the history and culture of the particular 
courthouse and courtroom?  If a judge is harsher on drug cases, it may make 
it more difficult to resolve a case in that court.68  Judges must approve the 
plea bargain, so understanding if a particular judge has had issues with 
certain kinds of plea deals is important.  It may be possible to get the case 
out of a particular courtroom and into another to resolve it.  For example, in 
more crowded jurisdictions, the calendar court may not be the trial court.  In 
such a jurisdiction (and situation) it is not unusual for prosecutors and 
defense lawyers to agree to send the case out to trial so it would go in front 
of another judge who would accept the plea deal. 
  
                                                   
66.   See Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence, supra note 19, at 396-97. 
67.   Id. at 391. 
68.   For an extreme example, see Very Tough Love, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Mar. 25, 2011), 
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/430/very-tough-love [https://perma.cc/JN35-LBAU] (discussing a 
judge in a small town in Georgia whose strong views about drugs and drug addiction change how she 
handles these cases both in terms of pressuring defendants to do her version of drug court and how she 
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C. Elements of an Agreement  
 
Once negotiators have figured out their interests, priorities, goals and 
criteria, they can start to consider the elements of the agreement.  This 
includes both the particular pieces of the potential agreement—in 
negotiation scholarship, these are called options—and what happens if the 
negotiation fails.  Both are crucial to consider in advance of the negotiation. 
 
 
















problem solving courts, 
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1. BATNA  
 
BATNA is perhaps the most ubiquitous term in negotiation literature, 
discussed everywhere since it’s coinage in Getting to Yes forty years ago.69 
It literally translates as Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement.  The 
concept is that a negotiator should know at what point she would walk away 
from this negotiation and go to her “best alternative.”  This prevents the 
negotiator from making a bad deal, a deal that would be worse than the 
alternative.70  In negotiating the rent for an apartment, for example, one 
might prefer an apartment with a nice view but, if the price is not lowered 
sufficiently, determine that the second-choice apartment with less sunlight 
makes more sense for her budget.  The BATNA is the action one would take 
(rent the other apartment) without needing the agreement of the negotiation 
counterpart.  In plea bargaining, if a negotiation is not successful, the 
BATNA for the defense attorney will almost always be going to trial (the 
prosecutor would have no choice but to proceed).  The prosecutor, on the 
other hand, might determine that the BATNA would also be going to trial 
or that the BATNA might be dropping the charges completely (and yet is 
unlikely to signal that during the negotiation). 
The second part of the BATNA analysis is knowing when to proceed to 
that BATNA—a concept that the negotiation literature often refers to as the 
reservation point or the walk-away point. 71  Understanding the point at 
which to go to the BATNA also takes separate preparation.  In plea 
bargaining, it might be easy to figure out that going to trial is the BATNA, 
but then one should predict what will happen in trial.  Looking at recent 
outcomes in this court, by this judge, with this jury pool, will help.  And yet, 
with the paucity of cases going to trial, it is often hard to predict—and 
therein lies one of the challenges of plea bargaining.72  
BATNA may be, therefore, a less important concept in plea 
negotiations.  Depending on the case, the facts, the particular prosecutor and 
judge, a defendant may be left with two choices: take a bad deal or go to 
                                                   
69.   FISHER ET AL., supra note 40, at 99-108. 
70.  Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO L. J. 1789 (2000); 
Jeffrey Senger, Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, in 1 THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE 379 
(Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017). 
71.   See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESS FOR PROBLEM 
SOLVING at 97-98 (3d ed. 2020). 
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trial and risk an even worse outcome.  In these situations, the defendant may 
simply have a WATNA, worst alternative to a negotiated agreement.73 
Prosecutors, by contrast, may think of trial as a BATNA.  If their facts are 
strong, and the law supports them, they can often expect a much tougher 
sentence after trial, due to the trial penalty.74 
 
2. Options  
 
Another part of negotiation preparation is to consider elements of the 
agreement, recognizing that each plea bargain can comprise more than time 
and jail.  Particularly in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, both 
prosecutors and defense attorneys may be, at times, getting more creative 
with individualized responses to each particular case due to the increasing 
recognition that  mass incarceration is disproportional to the goal it purports 
to serve.75  The core of problem-solving negotiation literature focuses on 
creativity and flexibility—how the pareto optimal solutions in negotiation 
will only be achieved with more fluid and dynamic thinking.  While some 
of this can (and does) occur at the table with the negotiation counterpart, it 
is also worth the time to prepare in advance so that you can demonstrate 
your openness and flexibility at the table.  Taking different perspectives, 
considering various designs and structures, and thinking about analogous 
situations can help open a negotiator’s mind to creativity.76  Moreover, the 
                                                   
73.   Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining, supra note 19. 
74.      See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 17–18 (2018), 
available at https://www.nacdl.org/Document/TrialPenaltySixthAmendmentRighttoTrialNearExtinct 
[https://perma.cc/2M6E-7F99] (“because plea negotiations are off the record and because most cases 
plead out, data regarding plea offers is largely unavailable, so there is no way to accurately calculate the full 
extent of the trial penalty .  .  .   a combination of anecdotal evidence and an analysis of prosecutorial 
practices, sentencing laws, and judicial decisions, strongly suggests that coercion plays a major role in the 
ever-increasing percentage of defendants who forego their right to a trial.”).  For a general discussion of 
coercion in plea bargaining, see Alkon, Hard Bargaining, supra note 19, at 413–15; see also ALKON 
& SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 129-33.  
75.   For example, problem solving courts developed due to the creativity plea bargaining 
allows. Cynthia Alkon, Have Problem-Solving Courts Changed the Practice of Law, 21 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 597, 612 (2020). 
76.     Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and 
Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 97 (2001); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, 
Creativity and Problem-Solving, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 697, 697 (2004); Janet Weinstein & Linda Morton, 
Stuck in a Rut: The Role of Creative Thinking in Problem Solving and Legal Education, 9 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 835 (2003). 
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process of being creative—giving oneself time and space to be creative, 
consulting with others and brainstorming, wordplay or other activities—
need to be built into negotiation preparation so that a negotiator can mull 
over different ideas.  Lawyers are not necessarily trained or particularly 
skilled in this type of thinking and, yet, as a society moving away from 
incarceration as an only option, this is an area where skilled lawyering can 
quickly make a difference. 
Different court processes and sentencing options are now common. 
Drug courts are widely available, both in large urban areas and in rural 
areas.77  Mental health courts and veterans’ courts are also widely 
available.78 In some jurisdictions restorative justice may be an option.79  In 
most jurisdictions there is some kind of diversion program—with problem 
solving courts being more widely available in some communities.80 
Prosecutors and defense lawyers need to know the full array of options 
in terms of alternative processes to handle criminal cases in their 
jurisdiction.  In addition to the threshold question of whether a particular 
defendant qualifies for an alternative process, defense lawyers also need to 
understand how those processes work in their jurisdiction and whether it is 
a good option for their particular client on that particular case. 
Well prepared lawyers know not only the charges that have been filed 
on a particular case but also what could be filed.  Are there additional 
enhancements that could be added (or threatened)?  For example, if a 
defendant has a prior conviction, can that be added as an enhancement to 
increase the amount of possible prison time?  Was there a weapon used in 
the case? Are there other possible charges?  Lawyers should know what 
could be added, what lesser charges might possibly fit with the facts, and 
what the minimum and maximum sentences could be.  Sentencing can be 
                                                   
77.   There are over 3,000 drug courts in the United States.  See, e.g., Drug Courts, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS (Nov. 2020), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238527.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8K5E-RJFX]. 
78.   There are over 300 Mental Health Courts in the United States. See Mental Health Courts, 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS JUST. CTR., https://csgjusticecenter.org/projects/mental-health-courts/ 
[https://perma.cc/U5EE-9MAG].  There are 461 Veterans Courts in the United States as of June 30, 
2016.  Veterans Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., [https://perma.cc/KSK7-T8WM]. 
79.   Shannon M. Silva & Carolyn G. Lambert, Restorative Justice Legislation in the American 
States: A Statutory Analysis of Emerging Legal Doctrine, J. OF POL’Y PRAC., 77, 85 (2015) (“32 states 
had statutory support for the use of restorative justice or specific restorative justice practices in their 
criminal or juvenile justice codes.”). 
80.   ALKON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 53-58 (describing diversion and concerns about 
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highly complicated on its own.  Competent lawyering requires that defense 
counsel accurately advise clients on what is the possible maximum under 
the existing charges, as well as any possible additional charges and 
enhancements.81 
 
D. Approach & Communication  
 
This last segment of the preparation sheet focuses on how negotiators 
interact with one another before and during the negotiation, understanding 
that everything from the previous relationship to the mode and timing of the 
communication all impact the substantive outcome of the negotiation.  
Effective negotiators consider these elements in advance rather than 
passively letting them happen. 
 
Approach/Communications 








Timing (What stage?  How 















                                                   
81.   The Supreme Court has not yet held that this is required.  See generally Alkon, Plea 
Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence, supra note 19 (discussing what competence standards 
could be and that minimal competence includes requiring that defense lawyers adequately advise their 
clients about possible additional charges and enhancements).  











There is so much analyzed under the concept of relationship in 
negotiation that entire books have been written on how to build the 
relationship,82 how to manage it, how to rebuild trust that has been broken,83 
and so forth.  A short exposition to this element of negotiation is woefully 
inadequate so let us just note here that there is much more to explore.  Why 
have relationships been the focus of so much negotiation literature?  The 
relationship often sets the tone for how much information is exchanged, 
whether the parties trust each other to bargain in good faith and consider 
fairly the information shared by the other side, if the parties are willing to 
be creative with each other and problem-solve solutions, and even the extent 
to which negotiators trust each other to comply with the terms of the 
agreement.  Building rapport within the negotiation has shown to lessen the 
likelihood of duplicity,84 increase the likelihood of integrative agreements, 
and leave the parties feeling like they were treated fairly.85  Particularly in 
repeat interactions, in which so many criminal lawyers are engaged, the 
relationship that prosecutors and defense attorneys have with each other can 
impact every element of negotiation we have already discussed.86 
In advance of the negotiation, one should consider the relationship 
between the negotiators and if there is any way to improve that beforehand. 
For example, as we will discuss below, how does the negotiation 
communication commence?  Are there ways to build rapport before 
exchanging substantive information or offers?  Additionally, during the 
negotiation, it is helpful to consider the relationship of the future 
recognizing that behavior now sets the reputation and relationship for the 
next interaction.87 
                                                   
82.   Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Building Relationships as Negotiation Strategy, in 1 THE 
NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE  295 (Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017); 
ROGER FISHER & SCOTT BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER: BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS AS WE NEGOTIATE 
(1989); DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO 
DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST (2d ed. 2010). 
83.  See e.g. Roy Lewicki, Repairing Trust, in 1 THE NEGOTIATION DESK REFERENCE 217 
(Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017).   
84.   Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-
Help, 24 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 481, 527-28 (2009). 
85.   Nancy Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, in 2 THE NEGOT. DESK REF. 516–
31(Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017). 
86.   Schneider, supra note 19. 
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Getting to Yes encourages negotiators to “separate the people from the 
problem”88 recognizing relationships separately from the roles adversaries 
can play. Defense lawyers and prosecutors often have long standing and 
close professional relationships.  They may be assigned to the same court 
for several years.  They may have worked together in different courts over 
decades.  As lawyers, they are by definition repeat players.89  Reputations 
are also well known and can impact how plea negotiations happen.  Defense 
lawyers will share less information with prosecutors who have a reputation 
for withholding evidence, or otherwise not being ethical.  Prosecutors may 
not have as much patience to negotiate with a defense lawyer who is known 
to be dishonest or who has a reputation as someone who is fighting all the 
time, regardless of whether the facts support the fight. 
 
2. Negotiation Style 
 
Another part of the interaction between the negotiators will be the 
negotiation style that each brings to the table.  Psychologists and others have 
outlined five primary approaches to conflict across an x-y-z axis of 
empathy, assertiveness, and flexibility: competitive, compromising, 
accommodating, avoiding, and collaborative.90 Effective negotiators 
understand that their style in negotiation should depend on the counterpart, 
client, and context and should recognize the advantages and disadvantages 
of each style in resolving a particular dispute.91  Moreover, this style might 
shift within the negotiation based on the item being negotiated as well as 
the ongoing progress and emotional tenor of the negotiation.  Overusing one 
style can be problematic.  Too much competitive behavior leads to others 
responding with increasing competitiveness, a lack of creative ideas, and 
harm to the relationship.  Too much accommodating behavior leads to a 
reputation as a doormat, also a lack of creative ideas, and a litany of unmet 
interests.  Even too much collaboration can be exhausting if time and energy 
is always devoted regardless of the need or complexity of the case. 
Similarly, not having all styles in one’s repertoire can also be limiting. 
                                                   
88.   FISHER ET AL., supra note 40, at 99-108. 
89.   Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-101 (1974). 
90.   Schneider, supra note 24. 
91.   Id. 
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While lawyers cannot avoid conflicts for which they are hired forever, 
choosing how and when to engage can make an avoiding style the best 
temporary choice.  Perhaps more factual research is needed.  Perhaps more 
brainstorming about creative options would make sense.  Perhaps you’ve 
already had a tough day and know that you need more energy to really 
engage. 
Choosing an appropriate style also should reflect the likely or typical 
behavior of the negotiation counterpart—and, therefore, the ability to assess 
the other side also falls within this preparation.92  How have they 
approached cases like this in the past?  What is their reputation in the field 
and among your peers?  Again, this is where reputation and repeat play can 
be advantageous to those negotiators who consider it carefully during the 
preparation phase and respond accordingly.93 
As discussed above, defense lawyers and prosecutors often have long-
standing work relationships.  This means that they may know what style or 
styles to expect with a particular defense lawyer or prosecutor.  We also 
encourage negotiators to recognize their own styles and how that might 
work with particular negotiating counterparts.  For example, a defense 
attorney who prefers a more collaborative approach to negotiation, may 
have to be more competitive, at least initially, against a prosecutor who is 
highly competitive.94 
Recognizing that you might be starting a long-standing relationship can 
also make a difference in the approach.  For example, when one of us was 
a public defender in Los Angeles, the standard advice when moving to a 
new courthouse, was to do a jury trial as quickly as possible in the new 
posting.  The idea was that it was important to quickly establish that you are 
a good trial lawyer and that you are not afraid of going to trial.  This can 
help when negotiating against a more competitive prosecutor—so they 
know that this particular defense lawyer is not a push-over and is a worthy 
adversary.  This can help to open up the possibility for more collaborative 
                                                   
92.   Id. 
93.   Catherine Tinsley, Jack J. Cambria & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Reputation in 
Negotiation, in 1 THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE 249 (Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider eds., 2017); Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Tough Guys Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive 
Reputation 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 621 (2002).  
94.   See Schneider, supra note 19.See also Schneider supra  note 24; See also, Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider and Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Negotiation Barometry:  A Dynamic Measure of Conflict 
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negotiations down the road.  Of course, ethics demand that defense lawyers 
not sacrifice one client for another—so the cases that go to trial should be 
those that would otherwise go to trial. 
The timing of a negotiation is another element to track.  We hear both 
anecdotally about settling on the courthouse steps and also know 
empirically that there is much pressure to settle cases when deadlines are 
set (even when these are “false” deadlines).  So, it logically behooves 
negotiators to consider both when in the course of the interaction they first 
make contact, as well as when they first exchange offers and how patient 
the negotiators can be in going back and forth.  If one considers negotiation 
to be linear, as Gerry Williams explained,95 then each stage has a certain 
timing to it as well as cultural assumptions about how long each stage can 
last.  The first stage of orientation might be the charging document or 
indictment in the criminal legal system.  The second stage, argumentation, 
might be considered when the first plea offers are exchanged and then the 
back and forth of the offers, and explanations that each side gives.  The third 
stage is the decision point—accepting the offer or not.  And then the fourth 
stage is reaching that agreement—writing up the details of the plea or 
diversion.  In particular, the length of the second stage of back-and-forth 
argumentation, has a lot of cultural and professional norms built into it.  For 
example, in the Midwest, the back and forth on home buying might be 
expected to be much shorter than other regions of the country that tolerate 
or expect numerous exchanges.  Similarly, in plea bargaining, jurisdictions, 
courthouses, and individual lawyers might each have different expectations 
or tolerances for this stage of negotiation.   
One challenge in plea negotiations is that first offers are often made 
before discovery is complete.  Lab reports on substances may not be back 
yet—so there is no confirmation that the white powdery substance is, in fact, 
a controlled substance.96  In the absence of laws requiring discovery,97 
                                                   
95.   Gerald R. Williams, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 70-89 (1983). 
96.   Field tests of drugs can be highly unreliable, and defendants can plead guilty before more 
reliable lab testing is done. See, e.g., Ryan Gabrielson, Houston Police End Use of Drug Tests that 
Helped Produce Wrongful Convictions, PROPUBLICA (July 14, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/artic
le/houston-police-end-drug-tests-that-helped-produce-wrongful-convictions [https://perma.cc/29LQ-
YE3Q]; see also Antonia Noori Farzan, He Pleaded Guilty to Cocaine Possession and Was Sentenced 
to 15 Years in Prison. It Turned Out To Be Powdered Milk, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2019, 3:42 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/10/16/oklahoma-man-pleads-guilty-cocaine-possession-
it-was-powdered-milk/ [https://perma.cc/ZH3M-SD4U].   
97.   For examples of more comprehensive discovery laws, see, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
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prosecutors may make offers that are “good today only” to force defendants 
to accept the offer before full discovery is provided.98  In many jurisdictions, 
it may be challenging for defense lawyers to get full discovery even if they 
are not rushed.  Defendants may also not want to wait for any future court 
dates and discovery if they are in custody and will be released immediately 
if they accept the time-served guilty plea. 
 
3. Concession Management  
 
Linked to the timing of the negotiation is how a negotiator should 
decide counteroffers. We have already outlined the importance of an 
optimistic and justifiable goal.  To be clear, the first offer should be at least 
that if not above it.  In a settlement negotiation, if the plaintiff would like to 
settle for $50,000 (for pain and suffering on top of expenses), would hope 
to settle for $40,000 (covering expenses), and would walk away at $30,000 
(having calculated that trial would be worth it at that point), the first offer 
could well be $60,000 with an optimistic reach and a justification of extreme 
pain and suffering.  It is a rare negotiation where the counterpart will give 
even more than the first offer so that offer likely sets the upper limit of the 
negotiation.  Because of anchoring, which we will explain further below, 
the first offer can set the stage for the negotiation in key ways, adjusting the 
counterpart’s goals and even their perceived alternatives.  At the bottom 
end, the reservation point (here $30,000) sets the lower limit of the 
negotiation range.  Effective negotiators, therefore, will consider how many 
steps they will make between $60,000 and $30,000 and what the size of the 
concessions will be.  Immediately lowering from $60,000 to $45,000, for 
example, sends a signal that the first number was not that realistic and that 
there are more concessions to come.  Understanding the general timing 
expectations of the negotiation (How long do we have to negotiate?  How 
many times should I plan to counter?) will help figure out the best way to 
counteroffer both in terms of how much to concede and how quickly to do 
so.   
Yet many plea negotiations begin and end at the arraignment.99  A 
                                                   
§§ 245.10–.85 (McKinney 2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2017).  
98.   See Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining, supra note 19, at 407. 
99.   But, it is hard to know how many as that data is not collected, see Schneider & Alkon, 
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significant percentage also likely plead out to the first offer without a 
counter offer being made.  Not making a counter offer and accepting the 
first offer may be good negotiation, depending on the circumstances.100  If, 
for example, a defense lawyer knows that their client has prior convictions 
that would increase the possible sentence, it might make good sense, and 
save years in prison, for their client to accept the first offer if the prosecutor 
doesn’t know about those priors yet.  It might also make good sense to 
accept the first offer if it is a standard offer, there are no particularly unique 
facts or arguments to persuade a prosecutor to treat this case differently, and 
the defendant wants the case resolved so they can get out of jail or stop 
having to come to court and take time off their job for the court 
appearances.101 
However, there are also cases that demand more negotiation.  It may be 
that once the lawyer has fully investigated the case, there is additional 
information that can encourage additional concessions by the prosecution. 
For example, if evidence or witnesses are discovered that support a self-
defense claim, that can be used to encourage the prosecutor to make more 
concessions and reduce the offer.  The reverse is probably more common: 
that prosecutors threaten to add charges or enhancements, to encourage 
taking the deal.102  As one of us experienced, threats were not uncommon in 
three strikes cases in California, depending on the policies of the particular 
prosecutor office.  Some prosecutors, on discovering a prior conviction, 
would offer the defendant to take the deal “today only” before the new strike 
was added. 
Because plea negotiations often happen quickly, and because there are 
often only so many opportunities for the negotiation, an extended plan of 
concessions is less likely to work.  But prosecutors and defense lawyers 
need to know where, when, and how concessions might work in their 
particular case. 
  
                                                   
100.   Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence, supra note 19, at 403-04. 
101.  See, e.g., Alkon, Hard Bargaining, supra note 19, a t 413-14; ALKON & SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 19, at 129-35, 197-209; MALCOM M. FEELY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING 
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1992) (describing the problem of repeated court appearances and 
the hardships that can create for defendants). 
102.  See e.g., Alkon, Hard Bargaining, supra note 19, at 406-08. 
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4. Negotiation Errors  
 
In the last twenty years, negotiation textbooks have enthusiastically 
integrated behavioral economics and cognitive psychology into decision 
making to better understand the common mistakes that negotiators make. 
The first is the phenomenon called anchoring, referenced above, or the 
concept that the first number that negotiators encounter “anchors” our 
estimation of the value of the item.  Even when these first numbers are not 
based on realistic criteria, they have a strong psychological pull.  In research 
studying topics ranging from home buying to average temperature guessing, 
these criteria can anchor the range of the negotiation.103  Within the legal 
context, things like statutory damage or insurance caps or opening offers 
serve this purpose as well.  Negotiators need to recognize this psychological 
pull and be prepared to counter with their own anchor in order to set the 
range. 
As noted above, in plea bargaining, defense attorneys might not have 
the option to create an anchor by making the first offer. Prosecutors often 
make the first offer when giving discovery. This may be at arraignment or 
in electronic discovery pre-arraignment, before the defense attorney has 
seen any information about the case and before the defense attorney could 
make a first offer. However, when there is no first offer, a defense lawyer 
may decide to wait for the prosecutor’s first offer, not recognizing the 
potential power of a first offer or that making the first offer might move the 
prosecutor lower in her own offer.  It might not be rational, and yet it appears 
that these anchors can shift parties away from their goals and limits.  When 
a defense attorney has those “good” facts, it may well behoove her to anchor 
the negotiation with a low first offer.  It could help to establish that this case 
is different and should be handled differently.  Similarly, prosecutors who 
want to scare defendants (and their attorneys) can use this phenomenon 
when making offers that include all sorts of added-on charges—or threats 
to add on charges.104 
                                                   
103.   SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING 146 
(1993); see also MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 26-28 
(1992).  
104.         One recent example is when federal prosecutors added charges to the case against 
actress Lori Loughlin, and other parents charged in the admissions bribery cases.  Prosecutors added 
these charges after Loughlin and the others rejected the first plea offer.  Ultimately Loughlin plead guilty.  
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The challenge in plea negotiations is that the maximum sentence in a 
case, even if that is not the offer, can act as an anchor.  This may happen 
due to the trial penalty (the likelihood that a sentence after losing at trial can 
be up to four times the length of sentence offered during a plea).  Prosecutors 
and defense lawyers recognize that in some cases, judges may sentence 
defendants to much more time, including the maximum, if the defendant 
goes to trial and is convicted.105  Understanding this, the trial penalty can 
serve as an anchor to all parties. 
Defense lawyers should be aware of the variety of anchors that may 
impact plea negotiations in their cases.  Making a first offer could help to 
set the anchor lower, but it depends on a variety of factors and can be 
complicated by existing laws and practices.  In some places, such as the 
federal system, it may be hard to anchor lower than the sentencing 
guidelines (even though the guidelines are not mandatory)106 and the 
guidelines may act as their own anchor.  Defense attorneys should be aware 
of the pull of the anchor and prepare how to counter-balance it when they 
can. 
A second phenomenon that can impact how negotiators view an offer is 
loss aversion—the fear of losing what one has (or changing the status quo). 
Loss aversion makes the current situation seem more attractive, even when 
that is unwarranted.107  For example, fear of going to prison when one is not 
yet there might increase loss aversion for defendants.108  Defense lawyers 
may fear worse consequences for their clients, based on previous cases 
                                                   
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/22/772443604/new-charges-against-lori-loughlin-and-
10-other-parents-in-admissions-case [https://perma.cc/S6UG-CRL3].  
105.  This is often referred to as the trial penalty. See e.g., Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining supra note 17, 603-605 (2014); Alkon & Schneider, supra note 19 at 
133-35; Nancy J. King et. al., When Process Affects Punishment: Difference in Sentences after Guilty 
Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 992 (2005).  
106.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
107.  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective in 
Barriers to Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 54-55 (Kenneth Arrow et al. 
eds., 1995) 
108.      Id.; Birke, supra note 19, at 247-54; Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, supra note 17, at 2507-13; Covey, supra note 19, at 229–30 (“However, where defendants are 
offered the opportunity to avoid a 600% trial penalty, even substantial variances in estimated 
probabilities fail to undermine the rational inducement to plead guilty. Rationality may be bounded, 
but it is not inoperative. Large sentencing differentials dramatically reduce ambiguity by 
exaggerating the penal consequences of the choice to contest a criminal charge, and thus make it easier 
for even boundedly-rational and loss-averse decision makers to make a utility-enhancing decision to 
plead guilty.”). 
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where they saw a client get a much worse sentence after not accepting a plea 
deal.  Prosecutors generally have high conviction rates, yet they may fear 
losing a case and be willing to reduce charges or make a better offer if they 
are not confident that they have the facts needed to convict.109 
A third error is reactive devaluation, the tendency to undervalue a 
proposal because it is offered by the negotiation counterpart.110 
Understanding that negotiators might not appreciate an offer from a 
counterpart, negotiators can test their own perceptions against the criteria 
for fairness that they have researched (as noted above).111  Additionally, 
negotiators should recognize that their own offers can suffer from automatic 
discounting and consider carefully how to frame the offers as a more neutral 
proposition.112 
Both defense attorneys and prosecutors could suffer from reactive 
devaluation.  Prosecutors who do not like or respect a particular defense 
lawyer, may be less likely to listen to their counter offer and the reasons an 
exception should be made in a particular case.  Defense lawyers may not 
trust a prosecutor who has previously withheld key discovery or has 
otherwise not been honest.  In that situation, if a prosecutor makes an offer 
on a case that might seem like a good offer, their first instinct might be to 
distrust it and wonder what they don’t know.  Did a key witness die?  Is 
there a problem with the evidence?  Defendants themselves can also suffer 
from reactive devaluation. Often defendants do not have a good relationship 
or have not had time to build a good relationship, with their defense 
lawyer.113 They may be influenced by others in the jail who speak of “public 
                                                   
109.   Prosecutors have an ethical duty to not prosecute cases they do not have facts to support. 
See CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A 
prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges 
are supported by probable cause, that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge is in the interests of justice.” Standard 3-4.3 Minimum 
Requirements for Filing and Maintaining Criminal Charges). 
110.  See e.g., Russell Korobkin, Psychological impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and 
Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 316 (2006) (“a negotiator might devalue an offer made 
by an adversary on the assumption that, if one's adversary is proposing a particular set of agreement 
terms, there is a good chance that those terms are good for the proposer and bad for the recipient.”).  For 
a discussion of reactive devaluation in a criminal context see, Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the 
Anchoring Effect Suggests That Judges Should Be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 1667, 1703 (2013). 
111.  See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
112.  See e.g., Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil 
Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 48-50 (1999). 
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pretenders” and appointed counsel who are “dump trucks” and don’t fight 
for their clients.114  This can create a situation where the defendant does not 
trust when his lawyer conveys the plea offer and advises that it is a good 
deal. 115  
A last mistake is overconfidence, a common phenomenon in which we 
overestimate the strengths of our case and underestimate the weaknesses.116 
Even in studying lawyers, where one might assume that expertise would 
prevent irrational optimism, lawyers on both sides assume they have a 
winning case.  This can impact plea bargaining, obviously, if both sides 
think they will win at trial and make it less likely that they will find some 
middle ground.  Experience and perspective tend to help in this area and so, 
to the extent that a lawyer (or the counterpart) is less experienced, consulting 
with others and getting a more realistic range of outcomes can be helpful. 
In criminal practice, newer lawyers may be more prone to 
overconfidence. A defense attorney may not recognize the fact that juries 
are often biased against their clients (because of their race, or the charges, 
or that many juries are quick to make up their mind that the defendant is 
guilty).117  Prosecutors are even more likely to suffer from overconfidence. 
They tend to enjoy high conviction rates and bias tends to work in their 
favor.118  Particularly newer prosecutors may not recognize when they do 
                                                   
Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence at 394-95 supra note 19. 
114.  For a longer discussion of dump truck lawyers and how to avoid being one, see Peter 
Johnson, You Might be a Dump Truck if… CONTRA COSTA CNTY BAR ASS’N (Apr. 2019) 
https://www.cccba.org/article/you-might-be-a-dump-truck-if/ [https://perma.cc/ZK6Q-A6X2]. 
115.  See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., concurring 
in the result) (“‘Nothing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the establishment of 
trust and confidence.’. . . ‘Basic trust . . . is the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective 
assistance of counsel.’” (quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 4-3.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1980); 
Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981); See also, Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The 
Allocation of Decisionmaking between Defense Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study 
of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 54-(1998); Lynn Mather, What do Clients 
Want? What Do Lawyers Do? 52 EMORY L. J. 1065, 1072-1075 (2003) (discussing defense lawyers’ 
attitudes towards client counseling and decision making). 
116.   Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, supra note 17, at 2498-503; Burke, 
supra note 19; see also Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of 
Cognitive Science, 47 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006).  
117.  See, e.g., Tim Eigo, Jurors, Lawyers and the Myth of The Open Mind, 48 ARIZ. ATT’Y 
MAG., June 2012, at 28, 30 (“As our data show, 80 percent of them begin making up their mind during 
the opening statements.”). 
118.      Burke, supra note 19, at 186-87, 192, 194–203 (“A growing body of scholarship on 
prosecutorial decision making explores the ways that the biased assimilation of evidence can prevent 
prosecutors from believing defendants’ claims of innocence .”). 
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not have the evidence to support a conviction, at least not on all charges.119 
Defense attorneys can push young prosecutors to talk to others in the office 
to help mitigate this.120 Defense lawyers who are sure they have a winning 
case, should talk to other defense lawyers who practice in the same 
jurisdiction to run the facts by them to get other views. 
 
5. Communication Modes 
 
The last element on our prep sheet is a focus on different types of 
communication and understanding the pros and cons of these choices.  Even 
before the pandemic put everyone on videoconferences, lawyers have been 
using different ways to exchange offers from in person to text messaging to 
emails (and now on video).  These choices matter in negotiation in general 
because each have their advantages and disadvantages over the course of a 
negotiation.121  These modes are different in three ways:  media richness (or 
how much you pick up in terms of social cues, mood, body language, tone, 
etc.); content (how formal or informal are the modes and what type of 
information is typically shared in that mode); and timing (is the 
communication synchronous or asynchronous and what are expectations for 
response time).  While we understand this intuitively, it is useful to spell out 
that face to face (or videoconferencing) provides the most richness in terms 
of seeing and reading the other party, often includes both informal (how is 
the weather?  How about that game yesterday?) and formal content and 
occurs simultaneously with parties going back and forth in terms of 
conversation.  Every other technology is different in one way or another. 
Phone calls, for example also vary in content and have synchronous 
communication but do not provide visual cues.  Email is different in all of 
these ways—we may or may not correctly read the tenor and tone of the 
email, we may or may not respond quickly (and can end up reading the email 
chain in reverse order), and we often consider it to be more formal 
communication. If there is any greeting at the beginning, it tends to be one 
or two lines and not the typical length of a face-to-face interaction.  Text 
                                                   
119.  Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1065 (2014). 
120.  Id.  
121.  Noam Ebner, Negotiating via Email, in 2 THE NEGOT.’S DESK REF. 115 (Chris Honeyman 
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messages, which are now being used to exchange plea bargaining offers in 
some cases, may shift this yet again as they are even shorter (although 
people often assume the response time is faster). 
Understanding all of these differences can help negotiators make wise 
choices given the advantages and disadvantages of these modes.  Studies 
have found, for example, that trust is much harder to build over email.122 
We tend to read these literally, make assumptions about intentions, and fill 
in the blanks.  Responses to emails are also more analytical, may send 
miscues about the tone, and may not share all of the information needed. On 
the other hand, emails can be excellent ways of keeping records, following 
up on details from a face-to-face conversation, and are easier to track than 
are text messages.  Negotiators should also consider their own comfort level 
with each mode of communication, and which plays to his or her strengths 
as well as which is more likely to be persuasive.123  Understanding how the 
counterpart negotiates can lead to more effective choices (i.e. ask for things 
face to face but immediately follow up with an email record or write out the 
arguments in an email to give the counterpart time to consider the ask and 
then make a call). 
It is not always possible to pick the mode of communication in plea 
bargaining.  There may be set practices, such as first offers being included 
in pre-arraignment electronic discovery.  Some jurisdictions have settlement 
days, with prosecutors expecting defense lawyers to come into the court and 
talk with them, at one time and only on those days.124  It is also common 
that plea negotiations happen in between cases being called for arraignment 
or other pre-trial appearances.  These conversations may be rushed and there 
may not be any specific time set aside for negotiations.  However, it may be 
possible to carve out different ways to negotiate particular cases.  If the 
norm is to negotiate quickly, in court, on the day a case is called, it might 
be that a defense lawyer could let the prosecutor know in advance that there 
is a case that is more involved and that it might be good to find a few 
                                                   
122.  See, e.g., Noam Ebner, ORD and Interpersonal Trust, in ONLINE DISP. RESOL.: THEORY 
AND PRAC. 203 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, et al. eds., 2012); Brian Farkas, Old Problem, New Medium: 
Deception in Computer-Facilitated Negotiation and Dispute Resolution, 14 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT 
RESOL. 161 (2012).  
123.  Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Sean McCarthy, Choosing Among Modes of Communication, 
in 2 THE NEGOT.’S DESK REF. 107 (Chris Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017). 
124.  The pandemic has changed some of these practices and it is too early to know what will 
return once in person court appearances return to being the norm. 
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moments to talk about it in advance of the court date.  Negotiating over the 
telephone is probably not the best approach.125  But, it might work to do a 
video conference. Most prosecutors and defense lawyers are managing 
heavy caseloads.  They don’t tend to have the luxury of being able to do a 
long and extended settlement conferences.  But, this does not mean that it 
should always be quick or always be done just like every other negotiation. 
The prep sheet encourages lawyers to think strategically about how they 
negotiate and where they negotiate to be more likely to get what they want. 
Prosecutors and defense lawyers should recognize that this is a strategic 




For negotiation scholars, some of the explanation in the elements of 
preparation might be repetitive.  Similarly, for criminal law experts, some 
of the elements of preparation might be obvious and seem automatic.  Yet 
we hope by bringing these streams together, this prep sheet is a useful tool 
that helps lawyers, and future lawyers, to approach plea bargaining in a 
more comprehensive way.  Plea bargaining is negotiation, albeit with 
constraints, and all negotiators can benefit from clear, organized thinking in 
advance.  Preparing for negotiation is a key skill in negotiation.  Moreover, 
this advance thinking needs to go further than typical law and facts to 
comprehend the elements of negotiation that make us more effective—from 
understanding the counterpart, to thinking creatively about options, to 
assessing whether to pursue trial, to recognizing that how and when we 
communicate impacts the relationship between the lawyers, and therefore, 
the outcome as well.  We also hope that having a joint prep sheet continues 
to send the message that criminal lawyers are engaged in joint enterprise in 
which they often have more in common, in terms of interests, goals, and 
practice, than assumed.  And, although there are key differences between 
prosecutors and defense lawyers, the same information matters (or should 
matter) in seeking justice.  Finally, we hope that this is not the last word in 
plea bargaining preparation but rather part of an ongoing conversation with 
lawyers, other scholars and clinicians in which we continue to consider how 
to improve the practice of law for the benefit of all. 
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APPENDIX 
PLEA PREPARATION SHEET126 
Case Name             
Charge             
Sentence Minimum/Maximum          








    
Goals     
 
Investigation & Criteria 
Facts 
Good/Bad  










Law & Policy 







Prosecutorial Policies?  
Court History/Judge  
 
                                                   
126.  ALKON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 19, at 210-11. 
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Possible Other Charges?  
Enhancements?  






problem solving courts, 






Reputation & Relationship 
between lawyers 
 
Negotiation Style (yours & 
counterpart) 
 
Timing (What stage?  How 
close to trial?) 
 
Concession Management 
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